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Civil Liability for Attorneys to Adverse Parties
When a Settlement Agreement is
Breached in California
DAVID M. LACY KUSTERS*
INTRODUCTION
During litigation, settlement contracts can create duties running
between attorneys and adverse parties. In general, attorneys have a duty
to deal honestly and fairly with adverse parties and counsel.' Sometimes,
however, contractual or fiduciary duties can run between attorneys and
adverse parties. When a settlement agreement fails through no or
negligible fault of the opposing party, the opposing party may be able to
seek remedy through civil liability against the attorney.
There are several causes of action that the adverse party in the
underlying suit can seek against the opposing attorney. The attorney may
be liable for breach of contract or tortious interference with contract. If
the contract or tortious interference with contract claims fail, the
attorney may be liable under escrow or restitution for any property
received. Lastly, the opposing party can seek equitable relief under a
theory of constructive trust or equitable lien.
The majority of the adverse party's causes of actions will fail. The
contract and tortious interference with contract claims will generally fail
for lack of privity or through absolution of liability by agency. Any
theory of escrow or restitution will generally be limited to a specific
factual scenario. Equitable remedies will generally fail because of an
adequate legal remedy.
There are, however, limited situations in which a California court
may impose civil liability against an attorney. Such situations create
* Associate, Fenwick & West LLP, San Francisco. J.D., magna cum laude, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; B.S., summa cur laude, California Polytechnic State
University, San Luis Obispo. I would like to thank Hon. Kevin M. McCarthy for his helpful guidance
with this topic and Melanie Lacy Kusters for her invaluable feedback through various versions of this
Note.
i. Wasmann v. Seidenberg, 248 Cal. Rptr. 744, 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Bernath v. Wilson, 309
P.2d 87, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
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unfortunate implications for California's legal system. An imposition of
duty on an attorney to an adverse party during litigation harms the
adversarial system. In addition, attorney-client privilege may require an
attorney to withhold exculpatory evidence in her favor. This Note
suggests a virtual per se rule against the imposition of civil liability on the
attorney to the adverse party when a settlement agreement is breached.
Exceptions to the virtual per se rule would be made for specific factual
scenarios where the attorney has wrongfully retained property or when
the attorney acts outside the scope of her agency.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the general duty that
attorneys owe to third parties. Part II examines various causes of action
available to plaintiffs. Next, various factors influencing liability are
detailed in Part III. Lastly, Part IV details the proposed virtual per se
rule against liability.
I. GENERAL DUTY OF ATTORNEYS TO THIRD PARTIES
Over 125 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an attorney
could not be held liable to a third party for professional malpractice
without a showing of fraud, collusion, or privity of contract.' Nearly
eighty years later, the California Supreme Court departed from strict
contractual privity in duty to third parties.3 In Biakanja v. Irving, the
court adopted a balancing factors test.' The test is "closely related to the
analysis and policy reasons used to justify permitting a third-party
beneficiary to recover in a contract action."5 The Biakanja court listed six
factors for determining whether an attorney owes a duty to third parties:
(I) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of connection
between the attorney's conduct and the injury, (5) the moral blame
attached to the attorney's conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing
future harm.6
The Biakanja factors were later refined by the California Supreme
Court in Lucas v. Hamm! In Lucas, an attorney prepared a will for his
client, who later died.8 Due to a drafting error, the plaintiffs received a
smaller share of the estate than the testator had intended.9 Despite the
2. Sav. Bank v. Ward, ioo U.S. 195, 206 (1879).
3. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d I6, i8-19 (Cal. 1958).
4. Id.
5. Wilson-Cunningham v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 725, 728 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Pizel v.
Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49 (Kan. 199o)).
6. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at i.
7. 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 196t).
8. Id. at 686.
9. Id. at 686-87.
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lack of privity between the attorney and the plaintiffs, the court held that
the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries to the contractual
relationship between the attorney and the decedent.'" The Lucas court
replaced Biakanja's moral blame element with an inquiry into whether
expansion of liability to the third party would place an undue burden on
the legal profession." In Lucas, expanding liability to the attorney did
not create such a burden.'" Since Biakanja and Lucas, California courts
have extended an attorney's liability to third parties on a number of
occasions.'3 After considering a number of third-party liability cases, one
justice commented that imposition of liability on an attorney involves "'a
judicial weighing of the policy considerations for and against [such]
imposition ... . ""' This Note starts with an overview of the available
causes of action against attorneys by adverse parties and then discusses
the policy implications for such liability.
II. CAUSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS
There are several causes of action available to plaintiffs seeking
remedy against an adverse attorney for breach of a settlement
agreement. This Note first details the legal causes of action of breach of
contract, tortious interference with contract, and escrow. Then, the
equitable causes of action of restitution, constructive trust, and equitable
lien are examined.
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT
In general, a breach of contract cause of action requires that the
parties be in privity with one another. 5 During representation, an
to. Id. at 687.
ii. Id. at 688.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745. 772-73 (Cal. 1992) (extending doctrine to
provide for auditor's liability); Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 742 (Cal. 1976) (applying
balancing test in a securities setting); Johnson v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312, 317 (Cal. Ct.
App. t995) (finding attorney's duty to extend to all partners within a limited partnership); Assurance
Co. of Am. v. Haven, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (insurance context); Home Budget
Loans, Inc. v. Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, 255 Cal. Rptr. 483, 486-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
an attorney liable for false representations regarding his client in a "to whom it may concern" letter
upon which a lender relied); Courtney v. Waring, 237 Cal. Rptr. 233, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
an attorney liable for negligently preparing a prospectus knowing parties other than his client would
rely on it in purchasing franchises); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 9oi,
905-o6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding attorney's misrepresentations in letter regarding status of
partnership to be adequate basis for cause of action by lender who foreseeably relied on attorney's
letter); Donald v. Garry, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191, i91-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding collection agency's
attorney owed a duty to a creditor who relied on agency to collect debt). But see Fox v. Pollack, 226
Cal. Rptr. 532, 535-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that attorney's duty does not extend to
unrepresented adverse party in real estate exchange).
14. Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfeld, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(quoting Goodman, 556 P.2d at 742).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. to, introductory cmt. (2003).
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attorney acts as an agent for his or her client." Since clients are known by
the adverse party during settlement negotiations, clients are fully
disclosed principals." When an agent acts with either actual or apparent
authority within the scope of agency, or the agent's actions are ratified by
the principal, then the principal is liable for breach of the agreement.'
The agent is relieved of any liability to the third party.'9
California law requires that "'an attorney must be specifically
authorized to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of
his employment he has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his
client to a compromise settlement of pending litigation .... Therefore,
California law requires that an attorney have actual authority to enter
into a valid compromise.2 In a situation where there is actual authority,
the agent is not bound by the settlement contract." Therefore, attorneys
with authority to enter into a settlement on behalf of their clients
generally will not be in direct privity with adverse parties. Even if privity
can be found, agency will relieve the attorney of any liability." Attorneys
generally will not be held civilly liable to opposing parties for breach of a
settlement agreement under a theory of contract breach.
B. LIABILITY IN TORT FOR INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
An attorney may be liable for tortious interference with a settlement
contract. In general, when an attorney is asked for advice, he or she may
"give it in good faith" even though the end result may be to interfere
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I, cmt. e (1958).
17. Id. § 146.
18. 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:34 (4th ed. 1999); Oelricks v. Ford, 64 U.S. 49, 64-65, (23
How. 49, 64-65) (1859).
19. 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 35:34.
20. Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 650 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Whittier Union High Sch.
Dist. v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)); see also Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d
760, 762 (Cal. 1969) (stating that an attorney is not authorized, merely by virtue of his retention in
litigation, to "impair the client's substantial rights or the cause of action itself").
21. Levy v. Superior Court, 896 P.2d 171 (Cal. 1995) ("[Sjettlement of a lawsuit is not incidental
to the management of the lawsuit; it ends the lawsuit. Accordingly, settlement is such a serious step
that it requires the client's knowledge and express consent."); Blanton, 696 P.2d at 650; Linsk, 449 P.2d
at 762.
22. 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 35:34. The Court in Oelricks concluded as
follows:
In the present case, the broker's note, and which is approved by the defendants, affixing the
firm name, is too clear upon the face of it to admit of doubt as to the person with whom the
contract was made.... The name of the principal is disclosed in the contract, and the place
of his residence, as the person making the sale of the flour, through his agent. This fixes the
duty of performance upon him, and exonerates the agent.
64 U.S. at 65; see also Marks v. Jos. H. Rucker & Co., 200 P. 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921). This Note is
limited to valid settlement agreements.
23. Oelricks, 64 U.S. at 65; Marks, 200 P. at 655-57; 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 18,
§ 35:34.
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with another person's business. 4 However, if the advice concerns a
contract to which the client is party, and the advice causes the client to
breach the contract, third parties may seek to hold the attorney liable. 5
Courts, however, have been reluctant to hold attorneys liable for the
breach of their clients' contracts. 6 Some courts have held that an
attorney's liability could be relieved under the same theory of agency as
described above. 7
California courts require that the plaintiff prove that the attorney
intended to cause the breach." In Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, an
attorney represented the executor of an estate in a sale of real property
belonging to the estate.29 The plaintiffs, real estate brokers for the
transaction, alleged that the attorney's negligence caused the plaintiffs to
lose $5,650.30 in brokerage commissions under a contractual theory."
The court held that mere negligence cannot result in liability for
interference with the contract.' Subjective intent to interfere with the
contract is required.32 In Schick v. Bach, an attorney represented a
psychologist who had been treating the plaintiff.33 The attorney advised
the psychologist that he could disclose confidential documents in a legal
proceeding.34 The plaintiff filed suit against the attorney for interference
with the contract between the psychologist and the plaintiff.3" The court
held that the attorney was not liable as a matter of law because the
complaint merely averred that the attorney "knew or should have
known" of the harm to the patient. 6 The plaintiff did not allege actual
intent.37 Therefore, unless an attorney subjectively intended to interfere
with the contract, he or she cannot be held liable under tortious
interference with contract. 38 Even then, agency principles may relieve the
attorney of liability.39
24. 45 AM. JUR. 2d Interference § 32 (2004); Randy R. Koenders, Annotation. Attorney's Liability
in Tort for Interference with Contract to Which Client Was Party, 85 A.L.R. 4th 846, 849-50 (2003).
25. See Koenders, supra note 24, at 850.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 859-61.
28. Id. at 853-54.
29. 65 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
30. Id. at 613.
31. Id. at 615.
32. Id.
33. 238 Cal. Rptr. 902,904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
34- Id.
35. Id. at 905.
36. Id. at 907.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 908; Costello, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 64-15.




An attorney may be liable to an adverse party under a theory of
escrow. When an attorney holds property of the opposing party until his
or her client turns something over to the opposing party, the attorney
may be an escrow holder of that property.40 If the attorney violates an
explicit escrow instruction, she may be liable for breach of contract.4' If
the attorney is negligent in her duties as an escrow holder, she may be
liable in tort for breach of escrow.
4
In Wasmann v. Seidenberg, the court imposed "a duty to safeguard
property entrusted to [an attorney] during settlement negotiations by an
adverse party."'43 In Wasmann, an attorney represented the wife in a
dissolution proceeding.' The husband agreed to convey his full interest
in community property to the wife in exchange for $70,000 or a
promissory note.45 The husband gave the deed to the attorney and, in
writing, stated that the attorney was "authorized to record [the deed]
only upon obtaining" the $70,000 in cash or the promissory note. 46 The
attorney delivered the deed to the wife and the husband received neither
the cash nor the promissory note.47 The husband subsequently sued the
wife's attorney for legal malpractice and constructive fraud.i8 The court
held that the attorney's acceptance of the deed gave rise to a duty of care
based on escrow.49 Wasmann's precedence is limited by its procedural
status. The trial court had sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. 0
The Wasmann court limited its decision to whether the plaintiff's
pleadings sufficiently plead a cause of action for escrow.' As such, the
court did not enter into a discussion of whether an escrow should be
imposed, only that it is legally possible. 2
D. RESTITUTION
An attorney may be liable under a theory of restitution. Recovery in
restitution is allowed when a person has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of the plaintiff. 3 "A person is enriched if he receives a benefit at
40. Wasmann v. Seidenberg, 248 Cal. Rptr. 744, 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
41. Id. at 747; Claussen v. First Am. Title Guar. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 749,752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
42. Wasmann, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 747; Claussen, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
43. Wasmann, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 746.





49. Id. at 746.
5o. Id. at 745.
51. Id. at 746.
52. Id.
53. Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 924 P.2d 996, 1003 (Cal. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
& UNJUST ENRICHMENT § I (Tentative Draft, 2000).
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another's expense."54 Retention of the benefit must be inequitable. 5 For
an attorney to be held liable under restitution, the attorney must unjustly
retain the benefit caused by the breach of the settlement agreement. In
the context of settlement agreements, attorney liability would be limited
to situations in which the client turned property over to his or her
attorney to pass to the opposing party. Only when the attorney failed to
pass the property to the opposing party will the attorney be civilly liable
to the opposing party. Both the escrow and restitution causes of action,
therefore, are limited to particular factual scenarios.
E. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
An attorney may be liable to an adverse party under a theory of
constructive trust. Constructive trusts are statutorily defined in
California.: The code states that "[o]ne who wrongfully detains a thing is
an involuntary trustee thereof, for the benefit of the owner."57 A
constructive trust may only be imposed when three conditions are
satisfied: (I) the existence of some interest in property, (2) the right of
the complaining party to the property, and (3) some wrongful acquisition
or detention of the property by another who is not entitled to it.58 The
existence of some interest may be based in an equitable lien 9.5 Despite
their statutory nature, constructive trusts are "creatures of equity." 6 As
such, courts are free to take into account equitable factors in determining
whether a particular transaction creates a constructive trust.
In Guzzetta v. State Bar, a review of State Bar proceedings, the
California Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust on an attorney
for the benefit of the opposing party.2 In Guzzetta, an attorney
represented the husband in a dissolution proceeding. 63 A restaurant
owned by the couple was sold and the proceeds were divided.6' Of the
proceeds, $3,000 was given to the husband, $3,000 to the wife, and the
balance was to be held in the attorney's trust account subject to
stipulation of the parties.6' The court held that the attorney was a
54. Ghirardo, 924 P.2d at 1003.
55. Id.; 66 AM. JUR. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 13 (2004).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2223 (West 2004).
57. Id.
58. Burlesci v. Petersen, 8o Cal. Rptr. 2d 704, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. I998); see also Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Zerin, 6i Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a constructive trust cannot
exist until an ownership interest exists in the purported beneficiary).
59. Zerin, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713.
6o. Edwards-Town, Inc. v. Dimin, 87 Cal. Rptr. 726,730 (Cal. Ct. App. 197o).
61. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 344-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Edwards-Town, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. at 730-731.
62. 741 P.2d 172, 181 (Cal. 1987).





constructive trustee for the wife with respect to the trust funds despite
her status as opposing party.6 As such, the attorney "owe[d] a duty as a
constructive trustee to his constructive beneficiary that is fiduciary in
nature.',6' Reviews of State Bar proceedings are based on a different set
of laws and statutes than civil proceedings. 68 As such, the precedential
value of Guzzetta is limited. Furthermore, the Guzzetta court provided
bare legal conclusions, unsupported by legal analysis. In determining
whether a constructive trust is an appropriate equitable remedy, courts
must weigh equitable factors.6' Guzzetta provided no analysis of
equitable factors. Therefore, Guzzetta merely stands for the proposition
that it is possible to impose a constructive trust on an attorney for the
benefit of the opposing party.7" Guzzetta is not helpful, however, in
determining whether such a remedy is appropriate. As an equitable
remedy, the Guzzetta court should have examined equitable factors in
determining whether a constructive trust existed." The set of factors
described in Biakanja (as modified by Lucas) could serve as the basis for
such an examination.7"
F. EQUITABLE LIEN
An attorney may be liable under a theory of equitable lien. An
equitable lien requires a promise to pay the adverse party combined with
either detrimental reliance by the adverse party or unjust enrichment of
the attorney.73 In general, "[o]ne who wrongfully withholds personal
property from another who is entitled to it under a security agreement
may be liable for conversion. '74 An equitable lien is a right to property
not in the lienor's possession as security for payment of a debt.75 It may
arise from a contract with an intent to secure particular property for a
debt or "out of general considerations of right and justice as applied to
the relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings." 6
The basis of equitable liens is variously placed on the doctrines of
estoppel, or unjust enrichment, or on the principle that a person having
obtained an estate of another ought not in conscience to keep it as
between them; and frequently it is based on the equitable maxim that
66. Id. at 181-82.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Most v. State Bar, 432 P.2d 953, 956 n.5 (Cal. 1967).
69. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 344-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Edwards-Town, Inc. v. Dimin, 87 Cal. Rptr. 726, 730-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
70. Guzzetta, 741 P.2d at 181.
71. David Welch Co., 250 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45; Edwards-Town, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
72. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961).
73. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Smith, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911,914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
74. Messerall v. Fulwider, 245 Cal. Rptr. 548,550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
75. 42 CAL. JUR. 3d Liens § 10 (2003).
76. I LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS: COMMON LAW, STATUTORY,
EQUITABLE, AND MARITIME § 27 (3d ed. 1914).
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equity will deem as done that which ought to be done, or that he who
seeks the aid of equity must himself do equity."
An equitable lien may form the basis of the ownership interest required
for a constructive trust.
78
For an equitable lien to exist, the plaintiff must prove: (i) some debt,
duty, or obligation from one person to another, (2) an object to which
that obligation fastens that can be identified or described with reasonable
certainty, and (3) an intent that the property serve as security for
payment of the debt or obligation.7 ' An attorney who has notice of a
third party's contractual right to funds received on behalf of his or her
client may be liable under a theory of equitable lien if those funds are
distributed.8° An equitable lien, as an equitable remedy, requires an
inadequate remedy at law to be present." "[Wihether an equitable lien
should be 'created' or 'recognized to exist' is a highly fact-specific sort of
question because each context has its own equitable considerations. 's2 In
California, the three cases of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Aguiluz 8'
("Kaiser"), Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Zerins4 ("Zerin"), and
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Smith85 ("Smith"), analyze an attorney's
civil liability to third parties during settlement. Although none of the
cases directly address civil liability to an adverse party, the analysis in
each of these cases can be analogized to an adverse party.
In Kaiser, an attorney represented a man in a personal injury suit
resulting from a motorcycle accident.86 Kaiser, the client's insurance
company, had paid $23,070.26 towards the client's medical expenses.87
The client had signed a contract stating, "I hereby authorize and direct
my attorney, if any, to reimburse Kaiser... by disbursing the money I
receive from such a settlement or judgment directly to Kaiser." 88 The
action for personal injury was settled, but Kaiser was never paid any of
the $23,070.26 it was owed." Kaiser filed suit against the client and
obtained a judgment for the full $23,070.26.' Despite being awarded full
77. 53 C.J.S. Liens § 5 (2oo3).
78. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707,713 (Cal. Ct. App. 8997).
79. 51 AM. JUR. 2d Liens § 34 (2oo3).
8o. Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Aguiluz, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665,666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Miller v.
Rau, 30 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
81. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Smith, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911,918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
82. Id. at 914 n.3.
83. Kaiser, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.
84- Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707,707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Smith, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.







compensation, Kaiser then filed suit against the attorney." The court,
relying heavily on Miller v. Rau,9' determined that since the attorney was
aware of the lien, he was liable for disbursing the full amount to his
client.93
In Zerin, an attorney represented three individuals insured by
Farmers Insurance in a personal injury action.94 Two of the three clients
had medical bills paid by Farmers.95 Farmers informed the attorney of
policy provisions that required reimbursement upon recovery from the
third-party tortfeasors.96 The attorney received payments from the third
parties and disbursed them to himself and his clients.7 Farmers then sued
the attorney for multiple causes of action, including equitable lien." The
court held that the case did not involve detrimental reliance or unjust
enrichment.' As such, no equitable lien attached to the settlement
funds. "
Kaiser and Zerin are factually similar, but have opposite holdings.
This fact was well examined in Smith.'' The facts of Smith are nearly
identical to Kaiser and Zerin.'°2 In Smith, an attorney had represented
eighteen different plaintiffs in personal injury suits." Farmers had paid
out a total of $47,057-45 to the plaintiffs. °4 Farmers had notified the
attorney that the insurance policy required reimbursement from any
recovery from third parties. 5 The attorney paid the recovery directly to
his clients and Farmers subsequently sued the attorney.'° The court held
that "a mere promise to pay is not enough to create an equitable lien on
a fund, at least when there are no considerations of either detrimental
reliance or unjust enrichment."'" The Smith court chose to follow Zerin
rather than Kaiser because Kaiser "never addressed the question of
whether an equitable lien should be impressed on the proceeds.""' 8 Kaiser
91. Id.
92. Miller v. Rau, 30 Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
93. Kaiser, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 668.
94. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
95. Id. at 708.
96. Id. at 709.
97- Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 712.
IOO. Id. at 713.
loi. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Smith, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911,912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Strangely enough,
Associate Justice Sheila Prell Sonenshine of Division Three, Fourth Appellate District was on both of




IO5. Id. at 912-13.
o6. Id. at 913.
107. Id. at 914.
lo8. Id.
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presupposed the existence of the equitable lien and, thus, is questionable
precedent.'" The Smith court then looked into an examination of
equitable considerations to determine that the attorney should not be
civilly liable."'
III. CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST HOLDING AN ATrORNEY LIABLE
The Biakanja factors (as modified by Lucas) require an examination
of various equitable factors in determining whether to hold an attorney
liable to a third party."' This Note examines both policy and other
factors to aid in the determination that the Biakanja test does not favor
holding attorneys liable for their client's breach of settlement
agreements.
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST HOLDING AN ATrORNEY LIABLE
An imposition of liability to an attorney would be predicated on a
duty running from the attorney to the adverse party. In determining
whether a duty is owed to a foreseeable third party, courts are to look to
policy considerations on a "case-by-case basis ....
Duty is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
analysis in itself. But it should be recognized that duty is not sacrosanct
in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is
entitled to protection."3
Two policy considerations in particular favor not holding attorneys liable
for their clients' breaches of settlement agreements: potential conflicts of
interests and attorney-client privilege.
i. Liability Would Create a Conflict of Interests
If an attorney is to be held civilly liable to an adverse party, that
liability is predicated on a duty owed to the adverse party (in contract,
tort, or equity). Imposing a duty on an attorney to an adverse party
would create a conflict with the attorney's duty to his client."4 Such a
conflict would denigrate the client's right to effective counsel and his
right to "free access to the courts."'"5
In Norton v. Hines, an attorney represented his client in a breach of
contract action against Norton."6 The claim was dismissed with the
so9. Id. at 914-i6.
11o. Id. at 917-19.
i i i. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, i9 (Cal. 1958); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. i96i).
112. Dillon v. Legg, 44I P.2d 912, 92o (Cal. 1968).
113. Weaver v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); see also Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am., 129 Cal. Rptr. 9i, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); McGarvey v. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 894,898-99 (Cal. Ct. App. I97I).
I 14. Weaver, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
115. Id. at 751-52.
16. Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
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attorney conceding that the claim had been pursued "merely in the hope
that some common basis for the action would develop or turn up...1.7
Norton subsequently sued the attorney for malicious prosecution and
negligent advice to the attorney's client." '8 The court stated that an
attorney owes a duty to his client to "vigorously" pursue the client's case
to the fullest extent of the law and professional ethics."9 If liability was to
be imposed, it would make attorneys second guess filing actions.'2
° The
long-term implications of such a rule would deny some clients their day
in court."'
In Goodman v. Kennedy, an attorney represented the principal
officers of a corporation issuing stock.'22 The attorney advised his clients
in the sale of stock to the plaintiffs.2 3 He advised that the shares could be
issued as dividends and sold to the plaintiffs without jeopardizing the
Securities Act of 1933 registration exemption.'24 The plaintiffs alleged
that the Securities and Exchange Commission eventually suspended the
exemption, causing the stock to lose value, damaging the plaintiffs.' The
court sustained a demurrer on the issue of negligence."' To allow such a
cause of action "would inject undesirable self-protective reservations into
the attorney's counselling role.'. 7 The court was concerned that
attorneys would be tempted to look after their own interests, to the
detriment of their clients."' Although the Goodman court was concerned
with negligence, the same logic can be equally applied to breach of
settlement or equitable causes of action.
2. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Duties of Confidentiality
Would Place the Attorney at an Evidentiary Disadvantage
Another troubling aspect of imposing civil liability on attorneys
involves the attorney-client privilege. Any conversations between the
attorney and her client would fall under the attorney-client privilege and,
thus, be prevented from being presented. 9 The existence of attorney-
117. Id.
It8. Id.
I19. Id. at 240; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. c (2000)
("A lawyer representing a party in litigation has no duty of care to the opposing party.... Imposing
such a duty could discourage vigorous representation of the lawyer's own client through fear of
liability to the opponent.").
120. See Norton, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
121. Id.




126. Id. at 747.
127. Id. at 743.
128. Id.
129. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 2003).
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client privilege is as vital to the public as it is to clients.30 Only the holder
of the privilege may waive it. 3' Thus, a client can prevent the attorney
from introducing evidence under the attorney-client privilege.'
3 2
If there exists any exculpatory evidence from privileged
conversations, the attorney may be prevented from presenting it. Even
after the termination of the attorney-client relationship, the attorney is
still under an affirmative duty to protect the confidentiality of his or her
client.'33 Courts cannot create an exception to force waiver of the client's
privilege.'34 Courts do not have the ability to "elaborate upon the
statutory scheme."'35 The strict construction of the statutory code leaves
no room for courts to create exceptions. 36 In addition, courts cannot
interpret the statutory exceptions to include situations not literally
exempt.'37 Therefore, courts cannot exempt the attorney from liability to
the client for a breach of attorney-client confidentiality.
If confidential conversations occurred which included evidence that
could relieve the attorney of potential liability, courts would not be
aware of it. Business & Professions Code section 6o68(e) explicitly
requires attorneys to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."':8
The danger of such a requirement can be demonstrated by way of
example. Suppose that after agreeing to the settlement, the client
changed his or her mind. The client told the attorney that he or she
130. See generally Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County, 62 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968).
131. CAL. EVID. CODE § 912 (West 2003); see also Rittenhouse v. Superior Court, i Cal. Rptr. 2d
595,597 (Cal. Ct. App. I991) (holding that "[o]nly a holder may waive the [attorney-client] privilege");
State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that courts
must examine the subjective intent of the holder of the privilege when determining if inadvertent
disclosure of privileged information constitutes a waiver).
132. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 2003).
133. Cf Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. i98o) (holding that a
therapist has no power to waive a client's privilege and is under an affirmative duty to assert such
privilege). While Mavroudis applied to therapists, the same reasoning can apply to attorneys.
134. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 law revision commission comment (West 2003).
135. Id.
136. Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 596 (Cal. 2000); Dickerson v. Superior
Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 1oo (Cal. Ct. App. 5982) ("[C]ourts of this state ... are not free to create new
privileges as a matter of judicial policy and must apply only those which have been created by
statute.").
137. People v. Resendez, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
138. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6o68(e) (West 2005). In contrast to section 6o68(e), the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to protect herself in such a situation.
Comment io to Rule 1.6 allows an attorney to "respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to establish a defense" to any "civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding.., based
on ... a wrong alleged by a third person." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.6 cmt. io (2005).
California has no such provision. The only exception under the California Code is "to prevent a
criminal act that the attorney reasonably believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily
harm to, an individual." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(2).
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would purposefully breach the settlement agreement. The attorney
would have performed no wrong, yet he or she would be unable to
present the conversation to clear himself or herself of liability.
Courts would not know whether such a conversation occurred. The
nature of attorney confidentiality prevents such knowledge. It is precisely
this lack of knowledge that creates a problem. Parties should be allowed
to present evidence in their favor. When privilege or confidentiality
prevents them from doing so, they are put at a distinct disadvantage. As
such, the existence of attorney-client privilege and confidentiality
disfavors holding an attorney civilly liable for the breach of a settlement
agreement.
B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST HOLDING AN ATrORNEY LIABLE
In addition to policy considerations, there are other considerations
that influence the Biakanja factors. In particular, the existence of an
adequate remedy at law and the ability to perfect settlement agreements
in California influence whether liability should be imposed.
i. An Adequate Remedy at Law Exists
In general, an equitable remedy is only available when there is no
adequate legal remedy.'39 This long-standing rule remains law in
California.40 If an adequate legal remedy exists, then courts have no
jurisdiction to enforce an equitable one. 4 ' An exception exists for
constructive trusts. "An action in equity to establish a constructive trust
does not depend on the absence of an adequate legal remedy..'.4 The
rationale behind the exception is that the court is merely requiring the
constructive trustee to fulfill his fiduciary obligation to the beneficiary.'43
In the breach of settlement agreements, an adequate remedy at law
generally will exist: sue the client. The existence of an adequate remedy
will foreclose any restitution or equitable lien claims.
2. Parties Can Perfect Settlement Agreements Without Liability
California law allows for the perfection of settlement agreements
through Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6." This provision allows
the parties, through motion, to "enter judgment pursuant to the terms of
the settlement."'45 In a section 664.6 motion, the parties can request that
the court "retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement
139. Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woollen Co., 67 U.S. 545, 551 (1862).
140. See Wilkison v. Wiederkehr, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
141. Id.
142. 76 Am. JUR. 2d Trusts § 668 (2003); see also Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 187
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
143. See 76 AM. JUR. 2d Trusts § 668 (2003).
144. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 664.6 (West 2000).
145. Id.
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until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. ,46
Parties are not required to use section 664.6 to perfect settlement
agreements.' 47 Use of section 664.6 is not exclusive.' 4s It is merely an
expeditious, valid alternative.49 Settlement agreements may also be
enforced by motion for summary judgment, by a separate suit in equity,
or by amendment of the pleadings to raise the settlement as an
affirmative defense.' While it may not be exclusive, the legislature
enacted section 664.6 to provide a summary procedure for specifically
enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.'5 ' The
existence of section 664.6 reduces the need to use liability as a deterrent
for settlement breaches. If such deterrence is required, the parties can
use section 664.6.
IV. PROPOSAL
The courts should adopt a virtual per se rule against holding an
attorney civilly liable to adverse parties for breach of a settlement
agreement. Instead, the adverse party should be directed to sue the client
for damages or enforcement of the agreement. Any need to create an
incentive to enforce settlement agreements should be relieved by the
ability to perfect settlement agreements through Code of Civil Procedure
section 664.6 and through the possibility of liability to the client. An
attorney should only be liable when two conditions are met: (i) the
attorney intentionally induced the breach and (2) the breach was not in
the best interests of his or her client.
A. BIAKANJA FACTORS WEIGH AGAINST ATORNEY LIABILITY
A virtual per se rule against liability to adverse parties for breach of
a settlement agreement would satisfy the Biakanja factors (as modified
by Lucas) in determining whether an attorney owes a duty to third
parties. Those factors are: (i) the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4)
the closeness of connection between the attorney's conduct and the
injury, (5) whether expansion of liability to the third party would place
an undue burden on the legal profession, and (6) the policy of preventing
future harm.'52 Each factor will be examined individually.
146. Id.
147. Robertson v. Chen, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that California Code of
Civil Procedure § 664.6 is not the exclusive means of enforcing a settlement agreement); see also
Nicholson v. Barab, 285 Cal. Rtpr. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. i99i).
148. Robertson, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. z998).
152. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, i9 (Cal. 1958); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. i96i).
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i. Extent to Which the Transaction was Intended to
Affect the Plaintiff
Settlement agreements are intended to affect the rights of the
parties. The agreement is a contract between the parties. Generally, one
side gives up the right to pursue legal action while the other side agrees
to pay compensation or refrain from or take certain action. Without both
sides being affected, the contract is without consideration. Therefore, the
creation of the settlement agreement is directly intended to affect the
plaintiff.
Creation of the settlement agreement, however, is not the
transaction that led to the lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff. The
transaction that caused the suit against the attorney was the breach of the
settlement. The individual with legal obligations is the client. The client's
intent is relevant to the matter of breach. The intent of the attorney's
client during the breach is a factual matter, but it is irrelevant to the issue
of liability for the attorney. The intent of the client should not control the
liability of the attorney. A person should not be held liable for the intent
of another. Only when the attorney has taken some independent action,
outside the scope of the agency, to induce his or her client to breach will
the attorney's intent be relevant to the transaction. This is the one
exception to the virtual per se rule. Since the attorney's intent is
irrelevant (except in the above mentioned exception) this factor cannot
justify liability.
2. The Foreseeability of Harm to the Plaintiff
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is directly related to the
foreseeability that the attorney's client will breach the settlement
agreement. Breaches of settlement agreements are the exception, not the
norm. It is not foreseeable that the average settlement agreement will be
breached. There may be situations in which it is foreseeable to the
attorney that his or her client will breach. This is purely a factual
determination for the trier of fact.
Once the decision has been made to breach the settlement
agreement, the plaintiff will almost certainly be harmed. The breach of
the settlement deprives the plaintiff of the benefit of his or her bargain.
Therefore, if the breach is foreseeable, then so too is the harm.
3. The Degree of Certainty that the Plaintiff Suffered Injury
In most breaches of settlement agreements, this will not be a
contended issue. The plaintiff has lost his or her benefit of the settlement
agreement. That which he or she bargained for has been deprived.
Therefore, this factor weighs neither in favor of, nor against, liability.
4. The Closeness of Connection between the Attorney's
Conduct and the Injury
The client's breach of the settlement is the cause of the plaintiff's
[Vol. 56:I1277
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS
harm. The settlement is breached by the client, not the attorney. Actions
taken by the client's attorney are at the behest of the client, since the
attorney is the client's agent. Unless the attorney is acting outside of the
scope of his or her employment as the client's agent, then the attorney
should not be held liable to the adverse party for his or her own conduct.
When the attorney is acting on his or her own volition, without the
authority of the client, there may be a closeness of the attorney's conduct
and the harm. It is difficult, however, to imagine a situation in which the
attorney's conduct would fall under this scenario. The only action the
attorney could take to encourage the breach would be to advise the client
to breach or to make the completion of the client's obligations infeasible.
Advising the client, however, is clearly within the authority of the
attorney. Giving legal advice to a client is the heart of an attorney's
responsibility.
An attorney making the completion of the client's obligations
infeasible may be acting outside the scope of his or her authority. An
attorney has an obligation to act in his or her client's best interests. It is
possible to imagine situations where breaching a settlement may be in
the client's best interests, as when the breach is efficient. Only when the
attorney has breached his or her duty to the client by acting contrary to
the client's best interests may this factor weigh in favor of civil liability to
the adverse party.
5. Whether Expansion of Liability Would Place an Undue
Burden on the Legal Profession
The expansion of attorney liability to adverse parties would almost
certainly place an undue burden on the legal profession. The imposition
would create a conflict of interests between the attorney's duty to his or
her client and potential liability to adverse parties. Liability would also
place an undue burden on attorneys to produce exculpatory evidence
because of their clients' privilege.
Imposing liability on an attorney to adverse parties would create a
conflict of interest for the attorney. The attorney has an obligation to act
in the best interests of his or her client. Any finding of liability would be
predicated on a duty that the attorney owed to the adverse party.
Imposition of liability, therefore, would create concurrent duties: one to
the attorney's client and another to the adverse party. Ethically, the
attorney would be in a Catch-22. Either the attorney will breach his or
her de jure duty to the adverse party or violate the Business &
Professional Code by acting contrary to the client's best interests. This is
a great burden to place on the legal profession.
Expanding attorneys' liability to adverse parties would harm
attorneys by prohibiting the introduction of potentially exculpatory
evidence. The attorney-client privilege and the attorney's duties of
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confidentiality prevent any communications between the attorney and
his or her client from being presented. The attorney is under a positive
obligation to assert the client's privilege, even to the attorney's
detriment. The client may waive privilege, but, if the client's misconduct
caused the breach, it is unlikely that the client will do so. Expanding
attorneys' liability to adverse parties would put attorneys at a distinct
evidentiary disadvantage. The combination of the conflict of interests
and effect of the attorney-client privilege ensures that this factor weighs
heavily against an imposition of liability.
6. The Policy of Preventing Future Harm
While imposition of liability may inhibit some breaches of settlement
contracts, there exist procedural safeguards that are more effective. Use
of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, for example, is a more effective
means to ensure that settlement agreements are not breached. Through
section 664.6, attorneys can request that the court retain jurisdiction over
the case. The judge presiding over the settlement can take measures to
prevent breach and quickly remedy any breaches that do occur.
Imposition of liability to attorneys, on the other hand, provides little
actual protection from future breaches. In a regime where attorneys can
be held liable for their clients' breaches, attorneys will more vigilantly
enforce their clients' obligations. However, an attorney has little power
to prevent his or her client's actions. As an advisor, an attorney is
powerless to prevent the breach from occurring. A judge, with
jurisdiction over the case retained via section 664.6, has far more power
to prevent breaches than a powerless attorney. Therefore, imposition of
attorney liability does little to prevent future harm.
B. LEGAL OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY
The six Biakanja factors (as modified by Lucas) dictate that, in
general, attorneys should not be held civilly liable to adverse parties for
the breach of a settlement agreement. The adverse party is left with a
simple alternative: sue the client. The attorney's client is in contractual
privity with the adverse party. This Note already assumes the existence
of a valid settlement contract. Consequently, establishing a prima facie
case should be relatively easy. If the client has already retained a benefit
from the agreement, proving equitable remedy such as trust or lien
should not be overly burdensome to the adverse party.
Many adverse parties would rather sue the attorney, however, out of
a fear that the client will not be solvent. If the attorney was in some way
at fault, the client will be able to seek contribution or perhaps even
indemnification from the attorney. If the attorney was not at fault, the
adverse party may suffer. An attorney, however, is not the insurer of his
or her client. It is inequitable that the attorney should bear the client's
financial burden. The loss is more justly borne by the adverse party.
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CONCLUSION
An attorney faces potential liability to adverse parties when a
settlement agreement is breached in California. Under the Biakanja test
(as modified by Lucas), however, an attorney should not be liable unless
he or she intentionally induced the breach while acting contrary to the
client's best interests. Otherwise, the attorney will be faced with a
conflict of interest and be placed at an evidentiary disadvantage due to
the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, California courts should adopt a
virtual per se rule against attorney liability to adverse parties for breach
of a settlement agreement.
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